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Abstract In microgrids, the integration of Distributed Energy Resources
(DERs) in the residential sector can improve power reliability, and potentially
reduce power demands and carbon emissions. Improving the utilization of re-
newable energy in households is a critical challenge for DERs. In this regard,
renewable power sharing is one of the possible solutions to tackle this problem.
Even though this solution has attracted significant attention recently, most of
the proposed power sharing frameworks focus more on centralized schemes.
In contrast, in this paper, the performance of a proposed distributed power
sharing framework is investigated. The problem is formulated as a repeated
game between households in a microgrid. In this game, each household de-
cides to cooperate and borrow/lend some amount of renewable power from/to
a neighboring household, or to defect and purchase the entire demands from
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the main grid based on a payoff function. The Nash equilibrium of this game
is characterized and the effect of the strategies taken by the households on the
system is analyzed. We conduct an extensive evaluation using real demand
data from 12 households of different sizes and power consumption profiles in
Stockholm. Numerical results indicate that cooperation is beneficial from both
an economical and environmental perspective and that households can achieve
cost savings up to 20%.
Keywords Microgrids · Game theory · Demand Side Management ·
Distributed Energy Resources · Electricity cost minimization problem ·
Carbon emission reduction strategies
1 Introduction
Increased energy demand, the devastating risks of climate change, and ambi-
tious emissions reduction targets have lead to significant changes in the ap-
proach of how to produce, distribute, and consume electricity [1, 15]. However,
the increased energy demand, along with the decreasing fossil energy sources,
is usually accompanied by a significant increase in the electricity prices. In
2013, for instance, the average EU residential prices were 0.20 euro/kWh, a
43% increase from the average 2006 price of 0.14 euro/kWh [2].
Smart grids symbolize the transition from conventional electricity grids,
where electricity flows one-way from generators to consumers, to intercon-
nected and flexible grids that ensure a bidirectional flow of electricity and
information between power plants and appliances, and all points in between.
Smart grids are intelligently integrated operational and technological systems
for optimizing power generation, distribution, and consumption across a city,
and may be considered as a key component of sustainable smart cities, opening
up for a broad spectra of new technologies and business models to increase
energy efficiency and reduce climate impact [6, 9].
Demand-Side Management (DSM), a key integral part of the concept of
smart grids, refers to management strategies that aim to increase the involve-
ment of end-consumers in the planning and implementation of innovative en-
ergy efficiency measures and solutions [13].
Further developing the architecture of smart grids, integration of Dis-
tributed Energy Resources (DERs) solutions can bring further reduction in
power demands. Many households and residential buildings are beginning to
adopt small-scale on-site renewable energy production sources, such as solar
panels. However, as renewable energy is intermittent due to its nature, they
keep connected to the main grid to secure their power demand during times
of the day when renewable energy generation is impossible due to external
whether conditions [14]. Connecting a group of households with DERs forms
what is called a ”microgrid” [14] which possibly has the capability to control
energy transfer between households and to help in improving energy efficiency.
On the other hand, households may have different power demand profiles due
to various factors such as occupants social grade and employment status, as
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well as the number and age of occupants. Besides, the time when renewable
energy is harvested and the time of households’ power consumption do not
necessarily overlap. As an effect, a mismatch occurs between the local gener-
ation of renewable energy and local power consumption in some households,
which reduces the utilization of local DERs.
Using energy storage [14] and injecting the surplus renewable energy into
the grid [20] are among the possible solutions that increase the benefit of
adopting on-site renewables. However, equipping each household with an on-
site energy storage unit may be economically unaffordable due to the high cost
of batteries which are required to buffer sufficient renewable energy for an av-
erage household daily power consumption [24], such as the recently announced
Tesla Powerwall battery [17]. Besides, batteries with long cycle life have a big
physical size that makes them difficult to be located inside households (e.g.,
Vanadium Redox-flow batteries [18, 21]). In addition, reinjecting power from
unpredictable DERs, such as solar energy, into the main grid at a large scale
(i.e., exceeding a certain limit) may cause grid instabilities. For instance, there
are strict laws in the U.S. that limit the total number of participating house-
holds that can inject renewable energy into the grid [20].
Considering the fact that households’ electricity consumption patterns do
not necessarily overlap, an alternative possible solution to maximize the po-
tential of DERs is to allow households to share their renewable energy among
each other in a cooperative fashion. Recently, power sharing mechanisms in
smart grids and microgrids have received significant attention [5, 16, 22, 23].
The authors in [5] introduce a centralized and shared energy storage system
for microdgrids that allows households to improve the utilization of their local
DER. In [22], another shared energy storage framework is proposed for the cost
savings trade-off problem among multiple users in a demand response system
using a Markovian model. The work presented in [23] uses a greedy matching
algorithm to determine which households should share energy in order to re-
duce energy losses. The authors assume that all households are always willing
to share energy with each other. A Peer-to-Peer energy sharing framework be-
tween multiple neighboring microgrids in a distribution network is proposed
in [16].
While interesting, most of this existing body of literature [5, 22, 23] has
primarily focused on centralized power sharing architectures. Moreover, the
environmental potential, such as CO2 emissions reduction, has not been paid
attention. However, it is interesting to define a distributed approach that can
give households full control and ability to adapt to the changes within the
system, and investigate the benefit of power sharing in this case.
In this paper, we assess the economical and environmental potential of
a proposed distributed power sharing framework for microgrids, where house-
holds can cooperate to reduce their demands from the main grid by exchanging
some amount of renewable energy among each other. The interaction between
rational households is modeled via a repeated power sharing game. Game the-
ory has been used recently in a remarkable amount of research in this area
since it provides efficient analytical tools to model interactions among entities
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Fig. 1: The proposed microgrid architecture.
with conflicting interests in a distributed manner [4]. In contrast to one-shot
games, players in repeated games interact with each other for multiple rounds,
and in each round they play the same game. In such situations, players have
the opportunity to adapt to their opponents’ behavior (i.e., learn) and try to
become more successful, which is very useful in the proposed distributed power
sharing framework. To the best of our knowledge, this work is among the first
attempts that investigates the usability of game theory formulations to design
a decentralized power sharing framework between households in microgrids.
The discussions and analysis in this paper extend the preliminary results
in our earlier conference paper [3] in various directions. First of all, the game-
theoretic model in this paper is more elaborate and the analysis includes new
discussions on strategy-proof properties. Secondly, the focus of this paper is
not limited to cost minimization analysis only, but we also present the environ-
mental potential, expressed as CO2 emissions reduction per kWh of electricity
demands, of using the proposed framework. Finally, the simulation results pre-
sented in this paper are extended and based on real hourly pricing tariffs and
real solar power and demand measurement data for households of different
sizes and consumption profiles.
The paper is structured as follows. The system model is illustrated in
Section 2. The proposed repeated game model is described and analyzed in
Section 3. In Section 4, the distributed power sharing algorithm is presented.
Numerical results are discussed in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper
and give pointers for possible future directions in Section 6.
2 System model
In this study we consider a generic microgrid which consists of a set of house-
holds N = {1, . . . , N}, where N = |N |, with a small-scale on-site DER (e.g., a
solar PV panel). Households are connected to each other and to the main grid
via AC power lines. Further, it is assumed that households’ power demands
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may be variable both in quantity and time and that they can approximately
predetermine their future demands. Time is divided in periods (e.g., days)
and each time period is divided in slots (e.g., hours), which represent the time
instants at which a certain event or an interaction may occur in the system
(i.e., borrowing/lending a certain amount of power).
In fact, households’ electricity consumption patterns do not necessarily
overlap with each other which can be exploited to reduce the need of purchas-
ing electricity from the main grid. This can be achieved by allowing house-
holds to share their renewable energy in a cooperative fashion. At a certain
time slot each household can be a power supplier and share some amount of
its harvested renewable power, and/or a demander which may request some
amount of renewable power from another household.
Further, the applied model assumes that each household is equipped with
a smart energy meter, which monitors and controls energy harvesting and
power consumption intelligently. Smart meters are also responsible of data
communications between households themselves and between households and
the main grid. They exchange information about households’ demands, avail-
able renewable energy, and pricing tariffs at each time slot. The proposed
system architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Let H = {1, . . . ,H} denote the set of time slots. A power action of a
household i ∈ N depends on a time slot h ∈ H. At every time slot h, each
household i has two values : i) an amount of renewable power Shi , generated
by its on-site solar panel, and ii) an amount of power demand Dhi , where
Shi , D
h
i ∈ R. From these values a household can determine at every h if an
additional power demand is needed or if it has a surplus amount of renewable
power. We assume that households satisfy their demands first from their own
DER. After that, if an amount of renewable power remains or if an additional
demand is still needed, they can cooperate and borrow/lend each other. This
is achieved by subtracting the renewable power value from the demand value
as follows:
Phi = D
h
i − Shi (1)
After a series of time slots, each household i will have a power vector Pi
that indicates the additional demands as well as the surplus renewable power
at each time slot h. This power vector is defined as Pi = [P
1
i , P
2
i , . . . , P
H
i ],
where Phi ∈ R.
Negative values of Pi indicate the required additional demands at the corre-
sponding time slots, while positive ones represent the surplus renewable power
that could be shared with other households. Then, each household will have
two vectors that can exchange with other households: i) Dˆi = [Dˆ
1
i , Dˆ
2
i , . . . , Dˆ
H
i ]
which contains the additional demands at each time slot h ∈ H, and ii)
Sˆi = [Sˆ
1
i , Sˆ
2
i , . . . , Sˆ
H
i ] which contains the surplus renewable power at each
time slot h ∈ H, where Sˆhi , Dˆhi ∈ R. Each time slot can represent different
timing horizons (e.g., an hour), where the relationship between Pi vector and
Sˆi and Dˆi vectors can be described as follows:
6 T. AlSkaif, M. G. Zapata, B. Bellalta and A. Nilsson
Pi = Dˆi + Sˆi (2)
3 Repeated power sharing game
3.1 Game formulation
The power exchange among households in the microgrid community is formu-
lated using a discounted repeated game, proposed by [11]. Consider a finite
normal form stage game denoted by tuple G = (N , {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ), where
N is the set of players in the game composed of all households in a microgrid
community, Si is the strategy space available for player i ∈ N , and ui is the
utility function for player i. Households are playing the same stage game G
repeatedly over time. In each stage, each household has the following available
actions:
– Cooperate (C): Household i cooperates and shares an amount of its re-
newable power with another household in the microgrid in order to increase
its payoff.
– Defect (D): Household i stops playing and sharing its renewable power
with its opponent if the opponent defects or if a certain benefit is not
achieved.
The utility function ui is the function used to calculate the payoff of house-
hold i from playing the game, capturing the monetary benefit earned by shar-
ing energy with other players. The household’s power cost for additional de-
mands, that has to be purchased from the grid and its residual renewable
energy can be used to determine the benefit (i.e., cost savings and accompa-
nied emissions reduction) earned by sharing power, and it is considered to be
the main factors of the utility function in this game. The utility function of
household i is defined as:
ui(si, s−i) =
∑
h∈H
chi Dˆ
h
i − αhi Sˆhi (3)
where chi is the cost of purchasing one kWh from the grid at time slot h ∈
H. In case of cooperation, where a household receives a certain amount of
renewable power from neighboring households, its additional demand’s cost is
reduced (i.e., an implicit benefit is achieved).
∑
h∈H α
h
i Sˆ
h
i denotes the residual
renewable energy cost at the end of each stage for household i, where αhi is
a weighting coefficient measured in cents/kW. This cost could be used as a
metric in a monetary unit to express the value of residual renewable energy in
household i at each time slot h.
The payoff vector is defined as r = (r1, . . . , rN ), where N = |N |, which
represents the utility that the households receive in the game. Each player
has a discount factor 0 < βi < 1 and it is assumed that this discount factor
is the same for all households. T = {1, . . . , T} denotes the finite history of
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length T = |T | that the repeated game is being played. The stage game is the
game played at each time period t ∈ T . The payoff of player i from playing a
sequence of actions in history of length t (i.e., s1, . . . , st, . . . ) is given by the
following discounted reward formula:
ri =
∑
t∈T
βtiui(s
t) (4)
There are two equivalent interpretations of the discount factor. One inter-
pretation is that household i cares more about its power cost reduction in the
near future than in the long term. The other interpretation is that the house-
hold cares about the future just as much as the present, but with probability
(1− β) the game may end in any given round.
3.2 Equilibrium strategy design
In the proposed repeated power sharing game households are assumed to have
patience and a long-term relationship to each other, which makes their strate-
gic behavior different from that of a one-shot game. That means that they have
a long-term plan to reduce their cost. Repeated play allows each player’s move
to be contingent on the opponent’s prior move, and thus each household must
consider the reactions of its opponent in making a decision. The fact that the
game is repeated allows the players to agree on a certain sequence of actions
and punish the players that deviate. The agreement among households is a set
of rules to cooperate and lend/borrow each other some amount of renewable
power. If two households cooperate, their long term benefit of cooperation
may outweigh the short-run temptation to defect. Thus, it can lead to a lower
cost for all households in a long-term. The most dramatic expression of this
phenomenon is the celebrated ”Folk Theorem” [10, 11]. The Folk Theorem
(Theorem 1) asserts that any feasible individually rational payoff can arise as
a Nash equilibrium of the repeated games, if players are sufficiently patient.
Theorem 1 (Folk Theorem) Consider a finite normal form game G, let
s = (s1, . . . , sN ) be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game G, and let s′ =
(s′1, . . . , s
′
N ) be a feasible alternative strategy of G such that: ui(s′) > ui(s),∀i ∈
N . There exists some discount factor β sufficiently close to 1, such that βi ≥
β,∀i ∈ N . Then there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the in-
finitely repeated game G(β) that has s′ played in every period on the equilibrium
path.
According to Folk theorem, a household can play s′ as long as its oppo-
nent has played s′ in the past as well. If a household does not consider future
and wants to maximize its utility at the current time slot by deviating and
switching to a strategy s′′i , its opponent switches in the next time period, for
a specified number of periods, to a strategy that minimizes the opponent’s
maximum payoff (i.e., to the strategy s). There are some famous punishment
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strategies in this case. One example is the strategy ”Tit-for-tat” [7] in which
players start out cooperating. If the households’ opponent defected, the house-
hold defects in the next round. Then it goes back to cooperation. In contrast,
in the ”Grim Trigger” strategy [10] players start out cooperating. If the oppo-
nent ever defects, the households defects forever. However, it is proved [10, 11]
that deviation is not beneficial if every player has a high enough discount
factor βi given by:
βi ≥ M
M +m
(5)
where M is the maximum gain from deviation and is calculated as follows:
M = max
i,s′′i
ui(s
′′
i , s
′
−i)− ui(s′) (6)
and m is the minimum per-period loss from future punishment:
m = min
i
ui(s
′)− ui(s) (7)
4 Distributed algorithm
In Section 3, it is shown that a household would be willing to cooperate and
borrow/lend some amount of power from/to another household in the micro-
grid. In particular, we proved via Folk Theorem that a SPE exists and can be
sustained if households are sufficiently patient (i.e., the discount factor β is
sufficiently close to 1). In this section, an algorithm is provided (Algorithm 1)
to be implemented in smart meters, in order to run the game and find the best
matching pair, from a pool of households, to play the stage game with. The
proposed algorithm gives flexibility to any household to change its matching
pair after a certain history according to some metrics (e.g., if a household’
opponent defected or if the cost saving is less than a certain threshold). The
strength of this algorithm can be summarized in three main points; i) it is
fully distributed, ii) it can be applied in any microgrid scenario regardless of
the size and power consumption pattern of participating households, and iii)
it allows a fair matching between households.
Assume a set of households N . Each household sets a list of preferences for
households of which it prefers to play the game with. This is done based on the
Eculidean distance between the household’s average additional demand vector
Dˆi and the average surplus renewable power vector Sˆj of each household in the
past history (e.g., last week). The Eculidean distance (di,j) between household
i and household j is calculated as follows:
di,j =
√∑
h∈H
|Dˆ
h
i − Sˆ
h
j |2 (8)
After that, each household defines a list of preferable households sorted in a
descending order. The greater the distance between Dˆi and Sˆj is, the better is
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Algorithm 1 A distributed algorithm executed by N households.
1: For each household i calculate Dˆi and Sˆi in the past week
2: Calculate the Eculidean distance matrix d between the N households
3: Sort each row in d in a descending order
4: Run Gale-Shapley algorithm (Algorithm 2) to find the best matching households based
on d.
5: Run the game between the selected pairs and repeat it for a certain number of time
periods T (e.g., one week), and allow the selected pairs to play cooperate (C) in each
stage
6: Calculate the payoff ri(s
′) after T
7: if (ri(s) < ri(s
′)) or (ri(s′) < threshold) then
8: Defect and leave the stage game
9: else
10: Keep cooperating with the same pair in the following time periods
11: The defecting households and their corresponding pairs go to step 1
Algorithm 2 Gale-Shapley (stable marriage) algorithm.
1: Set all households to be free
2: while i is free and prefers to play the game with j do
3: j= first household on i’s list to whom i has not yet proposed
4: if j is free then
5: (i,j) becomes a pair
6: else
7: some pair (k, j) already exists
8: if j prefers i to k then
9: k becomes free
10: (i,j) becomes a pair
11: else
12: (k,j) remains a pair
13: Return the vector of pairs which are going to play the game and cooperate during the
next week
the matching between i and j. These lists are used as an input in Algorithm 2
to find the best matching pairs based on Gale-Shapley algorithm [12] (i.e., also
known as stable marriage algorithm). The output of Algorithm 2 will be used in
Algorithm 1 to run the repeated game between the selected pairs for a certain
number of time periods T . In the repeated game, the selected pairs will play
cooperate (C) in each stage of the game. After T time periods, each household
i will calculate its discounted payoff (ri(s
′)) and compare it with the payoff
in the case of not cooperating and purchasing the entire additional demands
from the grid (ri(s)). If a cost saving is not achieved (i.e., ri(s) < ri(s
′)) or if it
is less than a certain threshold (ri(s
′) < ε), household i will stop cooperating
with its current pair and will enter Algorithm 2 to find another matching
pair to play the game with in the following time periods. Households whose
pairs defected and broke the relation will also enter Algorithm 2. The rest of
households will keep playing and cooperating with the same pair in the next
stage game.
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Table 1: The selected classes of households and their corresponding average annual con-
sumption.
Class Household area (m2) Average annual demand (kW) Number of households in the microgrid
Class A 81 3076 3
Class B 68.5 2384 3
Class C 47.5 2066 3
Class D 67 1714 3
Table 2: Solar PV system and performance Data.
Parameter Value
DC System Size (kW): 1
Location: Stockholm, Sweden
Module Type: Standard
Array Type: Fixed (roof mount)
Array Tilt (deg): 20
Array Azimuth (deg): 180
System Losses: 14
Invert Efficiency: 96
DC to AC Size Ratio: 1.1
5 Simulation results
In this section, the simulation results are presented and the performance of
the proposed distributed algorithm is evaluated. In the considered microgrid
system there are N = 12 households that run the algorithm and play the
repeated game. A time period represents one day and is divided to H = 12
time slots (i.e., two-hours time slots). For the electricity hourly pricing tariffs,
we use the electricity market spot price for Stockholm, Sweden, where data is
retrieved from Nord Pool Spot [19]. Simulations are done based on real demand
data for residential households of different sizes and consumption patterns in
a neighborhood in Stockholm, for the year of 2013. The considered classes of
households are listed in Table. 1.
It is assumed that the N = 12 households have a solar PV system, as an on-
site DER, with the same capacity, material and installation settings, and that
they generate a similar amount of renewable power with little variance (i.e., all
households are in the same area). Real hourly AC solar power measurements
for one year is used, which is outputted from a 1 KW solar PV system applied
in Stockholm with the characteristics listed in Table. 2. The renewable power
of each household i at each time slot h and each time period t is selected from
a normal distribution with the mean value of the solar AC power output and
the standard deviation of 0.05 kW. In Stockholm, the beginning of solar panel
energy harvesting, the energy peak and the end of harvesting differs a lot from
season to season. Thus, the harvested energy varies in different months as well
as in different days according to weather conditions.
In order to evaluate the benefit of the proposed framework, the distributed
power sharing algorithm is applied on the N = 12 households for one year.
As mentioned in Section 4, Algorithm 1 is run at the end of every certain and
periodic amount of time periods (e.g., one week or one month). In Fig. 2, the
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Fig. 2: Average weekly cost savings for each household in every month.
economical impact of the proposed distributed framework on each household
participating in the power sharing game is illustrated. It is represented by the
average weekly cost saving in every month. In this experiment, we assume that
households do not consider the value of their residual renewable energy in the
utility function (i.e., αh = 0). It is also assumed that all households are rational
and willing to cooperate. The case in which households have an intention to
cheat is out of the scope of this paper. When initializing the simulations (i.e.,
the first week of the year only), random pairs of households are set. After that,
households are allowed, by Algorithm 1, to make a decision to continue playing
the game with the same pair or to defect and look for another matching pair
for the following history of time periods. In the simulation, households are
allowed to do that at the end of every week. The decision is based on the
achieved cost saving xi, which is calculated as follows:
xi =
ri(s)− ri(s′)
ri(s)
(9)
where s and s′ denote to the strategies of playing Defect (D) and Cooperate
(C) in the recent history of time periods T (i.e., last week), respectively. In
Fig. 2, households are allowed to defect if no cost saving has been achieved.
A grim trigger strategy is proposed to determine the SPE, and the discount
factor is set to be very close to one (β = 0.95). After that, the average weekly
cost savings is calculated. As shown in Fig. 2, due to the variability in power
demands and power consumption patterns of households, a household can re-
duce the cost of its additional demand up to 20%, in some annual periods,
by borrowing/lending an amount of renewable power from/to another house-
hold in the neighborhood everyday instead of always purchasing the whole
additional demands from the grid. It is worth noting that the cost saving is
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Fig. 3: Temporal game evolution for different cost savings threshold.
achieved by sharing the surplus renewable power only. Households satisfy their
demands from their renewable available power first and after that if an amount
of renewable power remains, which may be lost if households do not consume
it, they share it with a neighboring household.
An alternative method is to allow households to defect if the cost saving xi
achieved is less than a certain threshold ε. Fig. 3 illustrates how the number
of defecting households changes, as the game evolves temporally, for different
cost saving thresholds ε. Every game iteration represents a time period (i.e.,
one week) during which the repeated game between each pair of households
has been daily played. It is shown that when ε = 10% the number of defecting
households is relatively high. For ε = 0, households are allowed to defect when
no cost savings has been achieved. Upon defecting, each household will run
Algorithm 2 and look for another matching pair to exchange power with during
the next week. It can bee also noticed in Fig. 3 that the number of defecting
households in the three different scenarios is tightly correlated with the time
period of the year. For instance, between April and August (i.e., iterations 15
to 32), the number of defecting households is comparatively less than other
annual periods, since the cost savings in those periods are higher. This is
because the renewable energy generation profile is typically much higher in
those annual periods in Stockholm.
In Fig. 4, the fairness in the distribution of cost savings achieved between
households in every month is compared in two scenarios. In the first scenario
(Scenario I), households are allowed to run Algorithm 1 and make the decision
whether to continue playing the game with the same pair or not at the end
of every week. In the second scenario (Scenario II), the decision to defect or
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Fig. 4: The fairness in cost savings achieved by all households in the two scenarios. Scenario
I: households are allowed to make the decision whether to continue playing the game with
the same pair at the end of every week. Scenario II: at the end of every month.
not is taken at the end of every month. The Jain fairness index is used as a
measurement factor. Jain fairness index is calculated as follows:
J (x1, x2, . . . , xN ) = (
∑N
i=1 xi)
2
N
∑N
i=1 x
2
i
(10)
where x1, x2, . . . , xN are the average weekly cost savings of the N household
at the end of every month. It can be observed in Fig. 4 that in Scenario I if
the decision, based on the discounted payoff, is made at the end of every week,
the fairness in cost savings achieved by all households is relatively higher in
most of the annual periods.
Fig. 5 shows the histograms of the individual hourly power demands during
one year before and after applying the distributed power sharing framework,
respectively. It is shown that the individual demands which are higher than
0.25 kW are likely to be greater before adopting the power sharing framework
than after. On the other hand, the individual demands which are lower than
0.25 kW are increased after power sharing. This is because a portion of high
demands has been satisfied and/or reduced after playing the power sharing
game.
In Fig. 6, the monthly environmental impact of the proposed distributed
framework is illustrated. The environmental impact is expressed as CO2 emis-
sions per kWh of electricity demands reduced by the N=12 households playing
the power sharing game in the microgrid. The emission factor for Sweden grid
electricity is 0.02468 kgCO2 per kWh generated [8]. As shown in the figure,
by using the proposed power sharing framework, households can increase the
utilization of renewable power and save the emissions that would be produced
if they bought their entire demands from the grid.
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Fig. 5: Histogram of the individual hourly demands of all households in one year before and
after the proposed distributed power sharing framework.
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Fig. 6: The CO2 emissions per kWh of electricity demands reduced by the N=12 households
in the microgrid in every month.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, a distributed power sharing framework for microgrids based on a
repeated game approach is proposed, where households take advantage of the
variability in their power demands and consumption patterns to improve the
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utilization of their locally harvested renewable energy through a borrow/lend
scheme.
The economical and environmental potentials of the proposed framework
are assessed based on real demand data and renewable energy generation pro-
files, as well as real hourly electricity pricing tariffs in Sweden. Simulation
results show that households are able to reduce their demand costs by up to
20% in some annual periods if they share their renewable power and play in a
cooperative manner without owning an on-site storage unit. It is also shown
that the proposed framework can benefit in reducing CO2 emissions per kWh
of electricity demands.
The study provides valuable insights on how a distributed power sharing
framework behave in a microgrid with small number of households and in a
place with extreme weather conditions. Besides, it opens the door to some
interesting extensions and future research, including a comparison with other
centralized frameworks and solutions that improve the utilization of renewable
energy. It is also of our interest to investigate the economical and environ-
mental potentials of this framework in areas located at different geographic
coordinates and with different weather conditions. In addition, the model al-
lows for extensions to consider that the matching household is able to provide
a continuous supply of renewable power for a certain request before sharing
it. Finally, selfish behavior and manipulation are also among the interesting
problems related to distributed frameworks.
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